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Showing posts with label air france. Show all posts
Showing posts with label air france. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 7, 2011

Secret Squirrel Considers Alarming Aircraft Problems.

Secret Squirrel has noticed the Airbus A380 has almost repeated what it did in Brazil, this time out of Venezuela when it encountered extreme turbulence as did the Brazilian crash A380.........and...the same thing happened.........almost.But Secret Squirrel has discovered a link between the two, and also a link involving yet many other airliner problems with speed,autopilots, and automated flight controls and instrumentation.Strangely,as things will be expounded on, they're actually not uncommon, but alarmingly common. But firstly let's have a look at the Brazilian crash.Some experts have blamed the speed monitors – called Pitot tubes – for fatally misleading the crew of Flight 447 that crashed in the ocean off the coast of Brazil on May 31, killing all 228 people on board.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1191929/Air-France-rushes-refit-speed-sensors-caused-crash-Flight-447.html

"Air France pledged to immediately re-fit the entire fleet of 35 long-haul Air France Airbus jets came after unions urged pilots not to fly them until the key sensors were updated. Investigators believe the sensors may have iced over during a fierce thunderstorm and delivered dangerously false information to the plane’s computers which caused the pilot to slow down so much the plane stalled and pitched into a
deadly tailspin.There was pondering that the the tail section of the plane, which includes the rudder and the vertical stabilizer - which keeps the nose from swinging back and forth – was sheared off by turbulence.The Airbus 330 has a ‘rudder-limiter' which constricts how much the rudder can move at high speeds. If it were to move too far while travelling fast, it could break off and take the tail section with it, said flight safety analysts.Asked if the rudder or stabilizer being sheared off could have brought the jet down, he said: ‘Absolutely. You need a rudder. And you need the rudder limiter on there to make sure the rudder doesn't get torn off or cause havoc with the plane's aerodynamics.’ ‘If you had a wrong speed being fed to the computer by the Pitot tube, it might allow the rudder to over travel,’ said Peter Goelz, a former managing director of the National Transportation Safety Board in Brazil.
The speed sensors need to be ultra-sensitive because the safety margin for a plane's speed at high altitude is so narrow that pilots call it 'coffin corner'. Either 70mph too fast or too slow and a jet can either stall or nosedive.One Air France pilot wrote on an Internet forum for airline professionals:
‘If the pitot tube is unreliable in bad weather and at high altitude, the plane becomes an airborne death trap. We need to know exactly how fast we are going or the plane will simply fall out of the sky.
'Another Airbus captain wrote: 'I have never been taught unusual altitude recovery in the simulator because I was told the plane has so many
in built protections. This sounds like very similar reasoning to what happened with the Titanic.'

Erick Derivry, spokesman of the main SNPL pilots union, said a threat to ask all pilots to stop flying the Airbus A330 and A340 jets elicited a 'very swift and positive' response from Air France.He said: 'Air France has provided us with an extremely pro-active and very accelerated replacement programme. From today, all Air France A330 and A340 flights will use planes equipped with at least two new sensors out of three on board.'"

Here from...
http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/editors/26821/

"What causes a passenger jet to suddenly plunge intact--with engines and wing surfaces working just fine--from cruising altitude into the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, killing everyone aboard?The full report on Air France Flight 447 in 2009, in which 228 people died, is still in the works. But one expert told me that preliminary
data suggest a role for human confusion, and a failure to focus on the plane's "attitude" or position in the sky: nose up or down, wings tilting left or right.
"You have a perfectly good airplane, other than not having airspeed data," R. John Hansman, aeronautics professor at MIT, mentioned to me today after we discussed the release of preliminary data on the accident, recovered from "black boxes" fetched from 12,000 feet below the surface of the ocean. "They clearly lost situational awareness. If they'd had it, they would have been able to regain control of the airplane."French investigators have said that the plane was entering an area of turbulence, possibly severe. They've also said the plane suffered a failure of its airspeed indicators, possibly because of icing on a sensors known as a pitot tubes.The aircraft climbed from 37,500 feet to 38,000 feet, and "stall warning" was triggered.This meant they were in danger of losing "lift." Why those warnings were sounding---whether they were valid, or based on inaccurate speed data--or whether the pilots ignored the stall warning because they saw high speeds that were inaccurate, is unclear.
It was late at night, more than four hours into the flight. Stall warnings were sounding. Speed indicators were going haywire. The captain had been called to the cockpit by an alarmed co-pilot. It took only about three minutes for the plane to plunge 38,000 feet to crash, belly first, on the surface of the ocean."
Air France Flight 447 slammed into the Atlantic Ocean, intact and belly first, at such a high speed that the 228 people aboard probably had no time to even inflate their life jackets, French investigators said Thursday in their first report into the June 1 accident."
More comes from......
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/international/item_MNTYiMvhUX0vyhMe8ZTb7N#ixzz1XJUslNuh

"The aircraft sent out automated messages starting At 11:10 p.m., a cascade of horrific problems began.Automatic messages relayed by the jetliner indicate the autopilot had disengaged, suggesting Dubois and his two co-pilots were trying to
thread their way through the dangerous clouds manually.A key computer system had switched to alternative power and controls needed to keep the plane stable had been damaged.An alarm sounded, indicating the deterioration of flight systems.
At 11:13 p.m., more automatic messages reported the failure of systems to monitor air speed, altitude and direction. Control of the main flight computer and wing spoilers also failed.The last automatic message, at 11:14 p.m., indicated complete electrical failure and a massive loss of cabin pressure -- catastrophic events, indicating that the plane was breaking apart and plunging toward the ocean."
Now,what happened to another Air France A380 when it encountered extreme turbalance on a flight from Venezuela to Paris?'When it encountered extreme turbulence, the Air France jet almost stalled and went into a nose-dive after hitting a storm.In the latest drama, the autopilot shut down as the plane hit a storm at 35,000 feet while flying from Venezuelan capital Caracas to Paris.The high-altitude alert in July chillingly echoed the cockpit chaos that preceded the fatal crash of an Air France Rio-Paris flight two years earlier, in which all 228 passengers died.

French daily Le Figaro said it had seen a report into the alert and Air France had launched a full investigation into the cause of the malfunction.The paper said the drama was 'comparable in every way' with the crash of doomed flight AF447 on June 1, 2009.It added: 'Only this time there were no victims, only two of the crew who were slightly hurt.'According to the report, the A340 Airbus was at its cruising altitude of 35,000ft, just as flight AF447 was before the accident, when it
hit extreme turbulence.'The plane hit a strong variation in wind speed and found itself going too fast - a situation which set off the "overspeed alarm".(With the ill fated A380 the incorrect airspeed data was the apparent cause of the disengagement of the autopilot, the reason the pilots lost control of the aircraft remains a mystery, in particular because pilots would normally try to lower the nose in case of a stall.)'At this point, the autopilot disconnected. It went into a steep climb and began losing speed.'The plane then slowed drastically to just 205
knots, with an Air France pilot telling Le Figaro: 'This was just three knots away from stalling and from probable catastrophe.'"

Now we're getting somewhere.What happened...."false" speed readings? The autopilot disconnects,perhaps, yes it did, it is indicated it did, the pilots had to fly the aircraft, but not the speed loss, the attitude of the aircraft.Clearly there is a problem, turbulance encountered, auto pilot disconnects but aircraft doesn't fly straight and level, and at speed, instead it goes in to a steep climb, begins to loose speed,the engines don't power up to compensate....clearly then there is a major problem, it centers about the autopilot AND flight computer problems (Airbus A380 is HEAVILY automated, and it makes it difficult for the pilots to fly manually, there is a joystick on either side for them to use when flying manually, a joystick.Here we can see the actula flight deck itself......

http://www.futurastudios.com/airbus-380-flight-deck/airbus-380-flight-deck-front.jpg

The Flight 447 accident may have some relevant similarities to other A330 incidents with other carriers. Three similar reports are on file at the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), with two incidents relating to Airbus A330s with flight computer problems, plus one which involved a Boeing 777. In the October 2008 accident, this fault caused injuries to passengers and damage to the aircraft on Qantas Flight 72, en route from Singapore to Perth, Western Australia, which was forced into a dive by a malfunctioning ADIRU. These incidents often started with the automatic pilot's disengaging and sending out ADIRU failure messages. Incorrect speed indications were also observed.The airframe and ADIRU involved in the Qantas Flight 72 accident were also previously involved in another incident on Qantas Flight 68, 2006. The Qantas aircraft were equipped with ADIRUs manufactured by Northrop Grumman, while Flight 447 was equipped with an ADIRU manufactured by Honeywell. A memo leaked from Airbus suggests that there was no evidence that the Flight 447 ADIRU malfunction was similar to the failure in
the Qantas incidents.

An Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) is a key component of the integrated Air Data Inertial Reference System (ADIRS), that supplies air data (airspeed, angle of attack and altitude) and inertial reference (position and attitude) information to the pilots' Electronic Flight Instrument System displays as well as other systems on the aircraft such as the engines, autopilot, flight control and landing gear
systems. An ADIRU acts as a single, fault tolerant source of navigational data for both pilots of an aircraft.The ADR component of an ADIRU provides airspeed, Mach, angle of attack, temperature and barometric altitude data. Ram air pressure and static pressures used in calculating airspeed are measured by small Air data modules (ADM) located as close as possible to the respective pitot and static pressure sensors. The ADMs transmit their pressures to the ADIRUs through ARINC 429 data buses.The IR component of an ADIRU gives attitude, flight path vector, ground speed and positional data.The ring laser gyroscope is a core enabling technology in the system, and is used together with accelerometers, GPS and other sensors to provide raw data. The primary benefits of a ring laser over older mechanical gyroscopes are that there are no moving parts, it is rugged and lightweight, frictionless and does not resist a change in precession.

Analysis of complex systems is itself so difficult as to be subject to errors in the certification process. Complex interactions between flight computers and ADIRU's can lead to counter-intuitive behaviour for the crew in the event of a failure. In the case of Qantas Flight 72, the captain switched the source of IR data from ADIRU1 to ADIRU3 following a failure of ADIRU1; however ADIRU1 continued to supply ADR data to the captain's primary flight display. In addition, the master flight control computer (PRIM1) was switched from PRIM1 to PRIM2, then PRIM2 back to PRIM1, thereby creating a situation of uncertainty for the crew who did not know which redundant systems they were relying upon.

Take note of this......

http://www.routesonline.com/news/24/atw/6975/qantas-suffers-second-a330-adiru-failure/

Qantas suffers second A330 ADIRU failure
by Geoffrey Thomas

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau said it was advised on Dec. 27 of an occurrence that day involving a QF A330-300 cruising at 36,000 ft. on its way from Perth to Singapore. Some 260 nm. northwest of Perth the autopilot disconnected and the crew received an Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor message (NAV IR 1 fault) indicating a problem with ADIRU No. 1.The crew implemented the new Airbus Operations Engineering Bulletin procedure by selecting the IR 1 and ADR 1 pushbuttons to off (ATWOnline, Oct. 15, 2008). The aircraft returned to Perth.
ATSB said the incident "appears to be a similar event to a previous event involving an A330 aircraft." In the October incident, 70 of the 313 people onboard the A330 flying from SIN to PER were injured when the aircraft pitched up and then dove twice after a failure of ADIRU 1. An ATSB preliminary report issued in November suggested the possibility that transmissions from a naval communications station interfered with onboard systems.

Now note this also, involving ADIRU and autopilot, and note what happened.........

http://www.airlinesafety.com/faq/777DataFailure.htm

On August 1, 2005, a Boeing 777-200, which had departed from Perth, received an EICAS (Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System) warning of  low airspeed, as the plane was climbing through FL (flight level) 380.  Simultaneously, the aircraft's slip/skid indication moved full right, on the PFD (Primary Flight Display). The PFD speed tape also displayed contradictory information: that the plane was approaching both the high speed limit and the low speed (stall) limit. The aircraft, still connected to the autopilot, pitched up and climbed to approximately FL410 as the airspeed decreased from 270 kts to 158 kts. The stall warning devices also activated.The PIC (pilot in command) "disconnected the autopilot and lowered the nose of the aircraft. The autothrottle commanded an increase in thrust which the PIC countered by manually moving the thrust levers to the idle position. The aircraft pitched up again and climbed 2,000 ft." The PIC advised ATC "that they could not maintain altitude and requested a descent and radar assistance. The crew was able to verify with ATC the aircraft speed and altitude."The PFD indications became accurate again as they were descending through FL200. The PIC attempted to use both the left and right autopilots, but had to turn them off after each one produced undesired command responses.  "There were no control difficulties experienced when the aircraft was flown manually, but the autothrottle 'arm' switches remained in the 'armed' position."ATC radar vectors put the plane in position to conduct an ILS to R 03 at Perth. When they reached 3,000 ft, the PFD again began indicating erroneous low airspeed information. The autothrottle again responded by advancing the thrust levers. Since the pilot can override that
command, simply by manually adjusting those thrust levers, the plane was able to land safely at Perth.  The FDR (flight data recorder), the CVR (cockpit voice recorder) and the ADIRU (air data inertial reference unit) were removed from the
plane, for a detailed examination. Under the supervision of the American NTSB, the ADIRU was shipped to its manufacturer for detailed analysis.The FDR data confirmed the erroneous acceleration values had been displayed on the PFDs, as the pilots reported.   The ADIRU produced those erroneous acceleration values and they were used by the PFC (primary flight computer). As it was designed to do, the PFC compared the information from the ADIRU, to the information coming from the SAARU (Standby Air Data and Attitude Reference Unit). That comparison ability
enabled the PFC to reduce the severity of the initial pitching motion of the aircraft.

Have a look at this,or rather ALL OF THESE..........

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Data_Inertial_Reference_Unit#Malaysia_Airlines_Flight_124

Alitalia A-320

On 25 June 2005, an Alitalia Airbus A320-200 registered as I-BIKE departed Milan with a defective ADIRU as permitted by the Minimum Equipment List. While approaching London Heathrow Airport during deteriorating weather another ADIRU failed, leaving only one operable. In the subsequent confusion the third was inadvertently reset, losing its reference heading and disabling several automatic functions. The crew was able to effect a safe landing after declaring a Pan-pan.

Malaysia Airlines Flight 124

On 1 August 2005 a serious incident involving Malaysia Airlines Flight 124, occurred when a Boeing 777-2H6ER (9M-MRG) flying from Perth to Kuala Lumpur also involved an ADIRU fault resulting in uncommanded manoeuvres by the aircraft acting on false indications. In that incident the incorrect data impacted all planes of movement while the aircraft was climbing through 38,000 feet (11,600 m). The aircraft pitched up and climbed to around 41,000 feet (12,500 m), with the stall warning activated. The pilots recovered the aircraft with the autopilot disengaged and requested a return to Perth. During the return to Perth, both the left and right autopilots were briefly activated by the crew, but in both instances the aircraft pitched down and banked to the right. The aircraft was flown manually for the remainder of the flight and landed safely in Perth.

Qantas Flight 68

On 12 September 2006, Qantas Flight 68, Airbus A330 registration VH-QPA, from Hong Kong to Perth exhibited ADIRU problems but without causing any disruption to the flight. At 41,000 feet (12,000 m) and estimated position 530 nautical miles (980 km) north of Learmonth, Western Australia, NAV IR1 FAULT then, 30 minutes later, NAV ADR 1 FAULT notifications were received on the ECAM identifying navigation system faults in Inertial Reference Unit 1, then in ADR 1 respectively. The crew reported to the later Qantas Flight 72 investigation involving the same airframe and ADIRU that they had received numerous warning and caution messages which changed too quickly to be dealt with. While investigating the problem, the crew noticed a weak and intermittent ADR 1 FAULT light and elected to switch off ADR 1, after which they experienced no further problems. There was no impact on the flight controls throughout the event. The ADIRU manufacturer's
recommended maintenance procedures were carried out after the flight and system testing found no further fault.

 Jetstar Flight 7

On 7 February 2008, a similar aircraft (VH-EBC) operated by Qantas subsidiary Jetstar Airways was involved in a similar occurrence while conducting the JQ7 service from Sydney to Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. In this event - which occurred 1,760 nautical miles (3,260 km) east of Learmonth - many of the same errors occurred in the ADIRU unit. The crew followed the relevant procedure applicable at the time and the flight continued without problems.

 Qantas Flight 72

On 7 October 2008, Qantas Flight 72, an Airbus A330, departed Singapore for Perth. Some time into the flight, while cruising at 37,000 ft, a failure in the No.1 ADIRU led to the autopilot automatically disengaging followed by two sudden uncommanded pitch down manoeuvres, according to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). The accident injured up to 74 passengers and crew, ranging from minor to serious injuries. The aircraft was able to make an emergency landing without further injuries. The aircraft was equipped with a Northrop Grumman made ADIRS, which investigators sent to the manufacturer for further testing.

 Qantas Flight 71

On 27 December 2008, Qantas Flight 71 from Perth to Singapore, the same A330-300 registration VH-QPA and the same ADIRU as involved in the Qantas Flight 68 incident, was involved in an incident at 36,000 feet approximately 260 nautical miles (480 km) north-west of Perth and 350 nautical miles (650 km) south of Learmonth Airport at 1729 WST. The autopilot disconnected and the crew received an alert indicating a problem with ADIRU Number 1.

 Air France Flight 447

On 1 June 2009, Air France Flight 447, an Airbus A330 en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, disappeared over the Atlantic Ocean after transmitting automated messages indicating faults with various equipment, including the ADIRU. While examining possibly related events of weather-related loss of ADIRS, the NTSB decided to investigate two similar cases on cruising A330s.
TAM Flight 8091
On a 21 May 2009 Miami-Sao Paulo TAM Flight 8091 registered as PT-MVB, and on a 23 June 2009 Hong Kong-Tokyo Northwest Airlines Flight 8 registered as N805NW each saw sudden loss of airspeed data at cruise altitude and consequent loss of ADIRS control.

Now isn't it wonderful with the degree of automation we have,with the technical skill of the systems designers,the computer programmers,remember!Remember when you board your ADIRU/Autopilot equipped aircraft,and you hear your welcoming announcement, "Welcome aboard your flight where nothing can go wrong,can go wrong,can go wrong,can go wrong........"

Tuesday, December 7, 2010

Secret Squirrel Determines The Cause Of The Concorde Crash.

Secret Squirrel turns his attention to recent developments concerning the Concorde airliner incident of that great many years ago,the investigation of the root cause of it all, and the outcome and ruling of a french trial concerning that event of July 25,2000,the crash of the Air France, Concorde. Squirrel has pondered events,and here presents them all to you, but sees a great many responsible for the accident and sees the root cause of the event, and sees that there were and are a great many items,any one of which, could have prevented that tragic accident, any one of which, but not one thing was properly done.The crash was not the culmination of a single event, but the result of a great many events.Let us ponder then events
at hand,what we generally know.............


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_4590

A Continental Airlines McDonnell Douglas DC-10 lost a titanium part, about 30 centimetres (12 in) wide and 43 centimetres (17 in) long, during a
takeoff from Charles de Gaulle Airport.(This strip was installed in violation of the manufacturer's rules on the thrust reverser cowl door of the
number 3 engine of the Continental Airlines DC-10.) During the Concorde's subsequent take-off run, (During takeoff from runway 26 right at Roissy
Charles de Gaulle Airport, shortly before rotation (take-off speed),)this piece of debris, still lying on the runway, ruptured a tyre which then burst. A large chunk of this (4.5 kilograms or 9.9 lb) struck the underside of the aircraft's wing structure at well over 300 kilometres per hour (190 mph). Although it did not directly puncture any of the fuel tanks, it sent out a pressure shockwave that eventually ruptured the number five fuel tank at the weakest point, just above the landing gear. Leaking fuel rushing over the top of the wing was ignited by an electric arc in the landing gear bay or through contact with severed electrical cables. At the point of ignition, engines one and two both surged and lost all power, but slowly recovered over the next few seconds. A large plume of flame developed; the Flight Engineer then shut down engine two, in response to a
fire warning and the Captain's command.

Having passed V1 speed, the crew continued the take-off (Aborting the take-off would have led to a high-speed runway excursion and collapse of the landing gear, which also would have caused the aircraft to crash. )but they could not gain enough airspeed on the three remaining engines, because the undercarriage could not be retracted due to the severed electrical cables. The aircraft was unable to climb or accelerate, and it maintained a speed of 200 knots (370 km/h; 230 mph) at an altitude of 60 metres (200 ft). The fire caused damage to the port wing, and it began to disintegrate - melting due to extremely high temperatures. Engine one surged again, but this time failed to recover. Due to the asymmetric thrust, the starboard wing lifted, banking the aircraft to over 100 degrees. The crew reduced the power on engines three and four to attempt to level the aircraft but with falling airspeed they lost control, crashing into the Hôtelissimo Les Relais Bleus Hotel near the airport.

The investigators concluded that:

* After reaching take-off speed, the tyre of the number 2 wheel was cut by a metal strip lying on the runway, which came from the thrust reverser cowl door of the number 3 engine of a Continental Airlines DC-10 that had taken off from the runway several minutes before. This strip was installed in violation of the manufacturer's rules.
* The aircraft was overloaded by about a ton.
British investigators and former French Concorde pilots looked at several other possibilities that the report ignored, including an unbalanced weight distribution in the fuel tanks and loose landing gear. They came to the conclusion that the Concorde veered off course on the runway, which reduced take-off speed below the crucial minimum. The aircraft had passed close to a Boeing 747 carrying French President Jacques Chirac who was returning from the 26th G8 summit meeting in Okinawa, Japan, which was much further down the runway than the Concorde's usual take-off point; only then did it strike the metal strip from the DC-10.

The Concorde was overweight for the given conditions, with an excessively aft centre of gravity and taking off downwind. When it stood at the end of the runway, ready to roll, it was over its approved maximum take-off weight for the given conditions.The Concorde was missing the crucial spacer from the left main landing-gear beam that would have made for a snug-fitting pivot. This compromised the alignment of the landing gear and the wobbling beam and gears allowing three degrees of movement possible in any direction. The uneven load on the left leg’s three remaining tyres skewed the landing gear, with the scuff marks of four tyres on the runway showing that the plane was veering to the left.

(One interesting note about the main landing gear is that if both were to just swing up to be stowed away they would hit each other and jam. The combined length of both undercarriages is greater than the distance between both undercarriage roots. This problem required that the undercarriage be first retracted vertically and then swung inwards to be tucked in the wing and fuselage belly......http://heritageconcorde.com/?page_id=4356)


So generally it is known that the event was brought about by a tire,or two being blown,and resultant debris smashing in to, but it seems not actually penetrating,the wing, and fuel tank.Interesting,curious.There are mentioned many tire incidents involving Concord, and it's so-called special tires,which,it seems were especially failing.Ponder these events......

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_4590

In November, 1981, the American NTSB sent a letter of concern, which included safety recommendations for the Concorde, to the French BEA. That
communiqué was the result of the NTSB's investigations of four Air France Concorde incidents, during a 20 month period, from July 1979, through February, 1981. The NTSB described those incidents as “potentially catastrophic,” because they were caused by blown tyres during take-off. The NTSB also expressed concern about the lack of adequate remedies, on the part of the French, as well as improper crew responses to those incidents.

* June 13, 1979: The number 5 and 6 tyres blew out during a take-off from Washington, DC Dulles Airport. Shrapnel thrown from the tyres and rims
damaged number 2 engine, punctured three fuel tanks, severed several hydraulic lines and electrical wires, in addition to tearing a large hole on the top of the wing, over the wheel well area.

* July 21, 1979: Another blown tyre incident, during take-off from Dulles Airport. After that second incident the “French director general of civil aviation issued an air worthiness directive and Air France issued a Technical Information Update, each calling for revised procedures. These included required inspection of each wheel and tyre for condition, pressure and temperature prior to each take-off. In addition, crews were advised that landing gear should not be raised when a wheel/tyre problem is suspected.”

* October, 1979: Tyres number 7 and 8 failed during a take-off from New York's JFK Airport. In spite of the well-publicized danger from the previous incidents, the crew ignored the new safety recommendations and raised the landing gear and continued to Paris. There was no subsequent investigation by the French BEA or the NTSB, of that incident.

In September 2005, Henri Perrier, the former head of the Concorde division at Aerospatiale, and Jacques Herubel, the Concorde chief engineer, came
under investigation for negligence: a report stated that the company had more than 70 incidents involving Concorde tyres between 1979 and 2000, but had failed to take appropriate steps based upon these incidents

* February, 1981: While en-route from Mexico City to Paris, Air France (F-BTSD) blew more tyres during another take-off at Dulles Airport. Once again, the crew disregarded the new procedures by raising the landing gear. The blown tyres caused engine damage which forced the flight to land at New York JFK Airport. The NTSB's investigation found that there had been no preparation of the passengers for a possible emergency landing and evacuation. The CVR was also found to have been inoperative for several flights, including one which followed a layover in Paris.

To save on weight, the Concorde was designed to take off without the assistance of flaps or slats. That required a significantly higher air and tyre speed, during the take-off roll, which imposed a much greater centripetal force load on the tyres. That higher speed increased the risk of tyre explosion during take-off. When the tyres did explode, much greater kinetic energy was carried by the resulting shrapnel travelling at great speeds tangentially from the rims (the kinetic energy of an object being directly proportional to the square of its speed), increasing the risk of serious damage to the aircraft. A thicker skin on the bottom side of the wings could have prevented serious damage from an exploding tyre, but that would have added too much weight, cancelling out most of the advantage of not having flaps or slats.

So the Air France Concord suffered a tire burst,

http://www.concordesst.com/latestnews.html

Mr Metzner.............(argued)..... that the Concorde's tyre burst because an important element of the undercarriage had been accidentally left out by Air France ground staff. As a result, too much weight was bearing on the tyres, one of which exploded when it hit a bump in the runway. Air France and the French air accident bureau admit that there was a mistake in repairing the Concorde's undercarriage but they insist that it could not have caused the tyre burst. However there is no factual evidence of any fire on the aircraft before it hit the piece of metal and the tyre burst from any marks observed on the runway. ...................

*Continental Airlines Accused of negligently allowing its staff to use banned titanium strips for aircraft repairs. If found guilty the company faces a fine of up to €375,000.

*John Taylor, 41, Continental Airlines mechanic He fitted the titanium strip which fell onto the runway before the doomed Concorde flight.
Henri Perrier, 80, head of the Concorde programme at Aerospatiale from 1978 to 1994 Accused of failing to respond to evidence of weakness in the aircraft's tyre and fuel tank designs..................

Events were even yet such that the British Concords were fitted with a special flap to deal with these events.Indeed here peruse this.......

http://articles.cnn.com/2000-08-03/world/crash.concorde.03_1_burst-tire-concordes-major-fuel-leak?_s=PM:WORLD

Air France confirms it did not make Concorde modification before crash

Air France officials Thursday acknowledged the airline had not made a design change intended to reduce the chance that tire blowouts on the Concorde would damage the supersonic aircraft.British Airways modified its Concordes in 1995; two years after a Concorde tire explosion sent a water deflector -- part of the landing gear --
soaring through a fuel tank. It was the second such time that a burst tire had dislodged a water deflector, documents show.But Air France said Thursday it opted not to modify the water deflector on its planes, saying the modification would simply ensure the deflector would remain in one piece, and would not prevent it from separating from the aircraft entirely.Air France was not legally required to make the modification, the airline noted.Concorde Flight 4590 departed that airport outside of Paris July 25, and crashed just minutes later, killing all 109 people on the plane and four on

the ground.......................Investigators say they know that one, possibly two, tires burst; that there was an intense fire caused by a major fuel leak; that the flight crew could not retract the landing gear; and that there were problems with two of the four engines.Speculation about the possible involvement of the water deflector came Thursday after French government officials confirmed they had discovered a piece of the water deflector on the runway at Charles de Gaulle Airport.U.S. and British government records show the Concorde has a history of
mishaps involving blown tires...............

Note, Air France did NOT modify it's aircraft after such a serious incident,an accident actually resulting in the wing AND the fuel tank, being actually penetrated,speared through.The British saw the clear and present danger, the French refused to heed it,nor acknowledge it.Clearly,negligence.

But we are looking at what is claimed to be debris on the runway have caused the tire(s) to burst,with the devastating events which came about,events the British Concorde escaped from.Continental claimed,though, that Concorde had not actually come to grief due to the debris on the runway left by it's DC-10, but rather had burst the tires and been on fire BEFORE it got to the debris.However events being what they are, runways are to be checked for debris, and the debris noted and cleared,and those who the debris is suspected of belonging to, informed of.And so too it was at Charles DeGaulle Airport, the runways were to be checked,regularly...but wouldn't you know it, all things being equal, at that French airport what kind of a situation do we have with respect to runway checks......

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/906610.stm

Questions over Concorde runway

The plane crashed less than two minutes after take-off.French investigators have said that an inspection of the runway used by the Concorde that crashed near Paris in July had been postponed because of a fire drill.A preliminary report on the crash in which 113 people died, said that a metal strip found on the runway could have gashed one of the plane's tyres. This may have set off the catastrophic chain of events that led the plane to come down in a ball of flames shortly after take-off.However officials from the French Air Accident Investigation Bureau (BEA) said the delay in the runway inspection did not necessarily have a bearing on the presence of the 43cm (17 inch) metal strip..............
At a news conference to present the preliminary report, BEA director Paul Arslanian said airport employees routinely inspected the runway three times per day.Paul Arslanian said the metal strip resembled an aviation part.
On the day the Concorde crashed, the runway was inspected at 0430 (0230 GMT), and a partial inspection carried out at 1430 because a plane was believed to have collided with a bird.A second full inspection at 1500 was postponed because of a fire practice which started at 1435. The Concorde took off at 1643.The report shows, therefore, that the runway was not fully inspected for more than 12 hours before the doomed plane took off.However airport authority spokesman Didier Hamon said it was usual for Charles de Gaulle airport to carry out its three inspections a day at "relatively flexible" times."If anything wrong would have existed, it would have been noticed immediately," he said.
"We do believe that everything was done that day as it is normal to do. On that day, nothing abnormal, nothing exceptional was reported to the airport authority."Mr Arslanian cautioned against drawing hasty conclusions."We need to understand what was done during the fire drill," he said.
The BEA director said the metal strip thought to have burst one of the plane's tyres looked "very like an aviation part", although investigators had yet to establish how it had ended up on the runway.Chris Yates, security editor for Jane's Aviation, said an airport such as Charles de Gaulle would be required to check for runway debris several times a day.He said: "The French BEA's admittance that these basic safety procedures were not adhered to may have contributed to the crash."
The BEA's preliminary report into the fatal crash, released on Thursday night, stresses that it was the destruction of a forward tyre on the plane's left landing gear - probably torn by the metal strip - that set of a chain of events that brought the plane down.

Well now,imagine, no inspection for 12 hours, and the statement.......airport authority spokesman Didier Hamon said it was usual for Charles de Gaulle airport to carry out its three inspections a day at "relatively flexible" times."If anything wrong would have existed, it would have been noticed immediately," he said.Well, it wasn't was it?It couldn't have, it wouldn't have, and it wasn't noticed.Clearly negligence.

It's is also interesting to note, that the flight commenced abnormally,even yet from the loading of the baggage,it's weight distribution, and even yet,it resulted in an overload condition.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_4590

British investigators and former French Concorde pilots looked at several other possibilities that the report ignored, including an unbalanced weight distribution in the fuel tanks and loose landing gear. They came to the conclusion that the Concorde veered off course on the runway, which reduced take-off speed below the crucial minimum. The aircraft had passed close to a Boeing 747 carrying French President Jacques Chirac who was returning from the 26th G8 summit meeting in Okinawa, Japan, which was much further down the runway than the Concorde's usual take-off point; only then did it strike the metal strip from the DC-10.The Concorde was overweight for the given conditions, with an excessively aft centre of gravity
and taking off downwind. When it stood at the end of the runway, ready to roll, it was over its approved maximum take-off weight for the given conditions.

The Concord started it's flight being overloaded,and not having proper weight distribution.Here clearly, the Airport Authority is responsible,and improperly loaded aircraft,improper with respect to both weight distribution, and also with respect to actual weight, one ton overloaded.Also, one must state, the pilot could not be aware of improper weight distribution, this being done by baggage handlers, but he was aware of the improper overweight condition and chose to ignore it. Here,clearly, we have negligence.

So now the pilot heads off down the runway he should never have entered,and there they say,they claim, that the strip,the part waits.....

http://www.concordesst.com/accident/stories/s28.html

Fatal Strip Fell from Continental DC10

Investigators looking into the Air France Concorde crash outside Paris on July 25 said yesterday that the 41cm (16in) strip of metal which almost certainly caused the accident seemed identical to one missing from a Continental Airlines DC-10 which took off minutes earlier. The French accident investigation bureau (BEA) said the strip found on the runway appeared to come from the cowling of the fan reverser on the DC-10's right engine.Continental said the twisted, epoxy-coated strip was the same shape as a piece missing from the engine of flight COA 55. It was not there when officials of the airline, the BEA, the US federal aviation administration and the national transportation and safety board inspected the plane in Houston on Saturday, it said.
The strip had been replaced on July 9 during a routine engine inspection. Because the investigation was continuing it was "inappropriate to comment further," the company added.

It has been said, that the use of the titanium strip was against airline practices,that such replacement had been banned, but a mechanic did perform
the replacement,the substitution, and it seem, most definitely, improperly so.So here Continental's maintenance procedures and the mechanic who did the job, are clearly negligent.Negligence........all round..what caused the Concord crash?ALL of these things, any one of which could have saved the Concord from coming to grief.

Causes:

1) Air France and Manufacturer(Sud Aviation)

For NOT carrying out the tire disintegration modification which was done on British Concords due to FACT that Concord tires were dangerously disintegrating, striking the wings,even yet resulting in piercing of the wings by tire boggie components.

2) Airport officials

Baggage handlers knowingly overloaded the aircraft, and placing the center of gravity in imbalance.

3) Airport Company which checks runway

For NOT properly checking runway.

4) Airport officials

Knowingly delaying and then not first proceeding with checking of the runway.(See also 2).

5) Pilot

For taking off with an overloaded aircraft,improper aircraft operation.

6) Continental

For improper aircraft maintenance,using banned techniques.

7) Maintenance Man

For improper maintenance procedure which failed.

8) Michelin

Concord had vast history of tire failures, special tires failed specially.

There we have it,we can conclude, eight causes, eight causes,count them, eight.But should any one of them have been properly done,Concord would not have come to
grief.There lies the cause,there lie the blame,and the passengers and crew lie in the earth,mangled,burned and roasted.

Secret Squirrel,
MRL.